December 2009 Archives

A teacher who was injured while chaperoning students on an official school ski trip was entitled to worker's compensation, Massachusetts' highest court has ruled.

Karen Sikorski, a math teacher at Peabody High School, was chaperoning a group of students from the school's ski club on one of their outings. The teacher fell while skiing and injured her shoulder. Her injury required two surgeries and a regimen of physical therapy, according to court papers.

Sikorski filed a worker's compensation claim with the city of Peabody, which is the legal parent of the school system. The city denied her claim, saying she was injured during her voluntary participation in a recreational activity. After the case worked its way through the Massachusetts appeals process, the state's Supreme Judicial Court agreed to review it.

In a Dec. 11 decision, the state high court ruled for Sikorski, saying that her skiing "arose out of and in the course of her employment as a teacher." The court noted that it was customary for teachers to serve as chaperones on the ski club's trips and to supervise students, enforce school rules, and monitor student safety. Further, the school encouraged teachers to participate as ski club chaperones, the court noted. And the teacher's skiing along with students was not comparable to certain recreational activities that had been found to be outside the realm of worker's compensation, such as playing softball on a company team or attending a company picnic.

The decision in Karen Sikorski's Case is available from by clicking on the opinions page of the Supreme Judicial Court.

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A federal appeals court has revived the race-discrimination lawsuit of a black school administrator who claims he received only partial payment for his unused sick days upon his retirement, while three white colleagues received full reimbursement.

William Houston retired in 1999 after 34 years with the Easton Area School District in Pennsylvania. He was the district director of support services at the time. Houston alleged in his suit that he received only 25 percent in pay, or some $33,000, for his unused sick days. At least three white administrators who retired about the same time as Houston received 100 percent pay for their unused sick days, according to court papers.

After hearing that some of the white administrators had received full reimbursement, Houston requested the same benefit, but was told that the district policy was to pay only 25 percent, his suit says. Houston sued, alleging race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

A federal district court ruled for the school district, saying that three of the white administrators did not have jobs comparable to Houston's because of distinctions made under Pennsylvania law.

In a Dec. 8 decision in Houston v. Easton Area School District, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, in Philadelphia, overturned the district court and reinstated the black administrator's suit. The court said the evidence of the three white administrators' benefits packages should not have been excluded by the district court.

"Evidence of additional similarly situated employees outside of Houston's protected class--each of whom received or was promised 100 percent of his sick pay upon retirement--likely would have changed the entire complexion of the trial," the court said.

(Hat Tip to NSBA's Legal Clips on this case.)

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The U.S. Supreme Court today declined to hear the appeal of a New Mexico student who was denied admission to a state military high school because of her behaviorial problems and her need for counseling and medication.

Sarah Ellenberg sought admission the the New Mexico Military Institute in 2003. The college-preparatory school acknowledged in court papers that it denied Ellenberg because of her past drug use, her behaviorial problems, and the fact that she was in a residential treatment program at the time. It said she could re-apply after she had demonstrated she could succeed in a regular educational environment.

Ellenberg sued over the denial. She argued that because she was eligible for special education services under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, she automatically qualified as having a disability under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Thus, she argued, the school should not have based its admissions decision on behavior that stemmed from her disability, which is described in court papers as "oppositional defiance disorder."

Both a federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, in Denver, ruled for the military institute. In a July 10 decision, a three-judge panel of the 10th Circuit court held that the three federal laws at issue have somewhat different definitions of disability.

"Ellenberg's failure to offer evidence that her disability substantially impairs a major life activity is fatal to her prima facie case under Section 504 and the ADA," the appeals court said.

The Supreme Court declined without comment to hear the student's appeal in Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Institute (Case No. 09-429).

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A federal appeals court today upheld frequent paddlings of a high school basketball player in Memphis by his coaches over missed practices, tardiness, poor grades, and even, allegedly, for missed shots during basketball games.

Noting that Tennessee law permits corporal punishment by teachers "for good cause in order to maintain discipline and order within the public schools," a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, in Cincinnati, ruled unanimously that "a reasonable juror could conclude that the paddlings administered by [the two coaches] were for disciplinary purposes, and were not 'excessive' in severity, frequency, motivation, or means."

The case brought by Martin Nolan, a student at Hamilton High School in Memphis from 2001 to 2004, against the two basketball coaches, school administrators, and the Memphis district alleged that the paddlings violated his 14th Amendment right to substantive due process of law.

At trial, the coaches denied paddling Nolan for missing shots, saying he may have been paddled for demonstrating poor technique on the court. But they acknowledged paddling him for disciplinary reasons and, on a few occasions, for poor grades. The district's then-superintendent testified that she believed one of the coaches paddled basketball players for missing shots and that she suspended him from coaching as a result.

The coaches said they did not use much force in paddling Nolan, and the defendants presented evidence that the student did not suffer any serious injuries. The jury ruled for the defendants on all claims.

In its ruling in Nolan v. Memphis City Schools, the 6th Circuit panel said the paddlings "did not amount to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power that shocks the conscience."

"The Nolans contend that paddling a high school student for a nondisciplinary
reason cannot be tolerated in a civilized society," the court said. "The jury, however, was entitled to draw a different conclusion."

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The U.S. Supreme Court today agreed to review whether a public college may deny recognition to a student religious group because the group requires its members to agree with its religious beliefs.

The case, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (No. 08-1371), involves a dispute between the University of California's Hastings College of Law in San Francisco and the law school's chapter of the Springfield, Va.-based society of Christian lawyers and law students. But the case has implications for K-12 public schools, as well, as there have been cases out of such schools raising the same question of whether religious clubs may restrict their membership to core believers.

The Hastings dispute arose after the law school refused to recognize the Christian Legal Society chapter because the group refused to adhere to the school's non-discrimination policy. Specifically, the group refuses to refrain from discrimination on the basis of religion or sexual orientation, the law school says in court papers.

The CLS chapter says in court papers that it only has voting members, and such members must affirm the national organization's "statement of faith," which involves "a shared devotion to Jesus Christ." The statement says that "unrepentant participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent' with the group's beliefs.

The law school's denial of recognition to the CLS chapter meant it did not have access to meeting space, to communications channels such as announcements in law school newsletters and e-mail to students, and the opportunity to apply for funding from student activity fees.

The chapter sued the law school in federal court, alleging violations of its rights of free speech, expressive association, free exercise of religion, and equal protection of the law.

A federal district court upheld the law school's actions, and in March, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in San Francisco, unanimously affirmed the lower court in a short opinion that cited another recent 9th Circuit decision addressing the issue in the K-12 context.

In that case, Truth v. Kent School District, the 9th Circuit upheld a Washington state school district's decision to deny recognition to a student Christian club that limited officer positions and voting membership. The court said the school's application of its non-discrimination policy to the club did not violate the club's First Amendment free-speech rights. The court in that case also held that the school's actions did not violate the federal Equal Access Act, which requires secondary schools receiving federal funds to treat all non-curricular clubs on an equal basis. The act does not apply to higher education.

In June, the Supreme Court declined the Truth club's appeal of that ruling, which I blogged about here.

In the Christian Legal Society chapter's appeal of its case, the group argued that the 9th Circuit's rulings conflict with rulings by at least two other federal circuit courts on the rights of student religious groups to restrict their membership and still enjoy recognition by public schools and colleges.

For example, the group said the 9th Circuit ruling conflicted with a 1996 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, in New York City, that a school district violated a high school Bible club's rights under the Equal Access Act when the district said the club could not be recognized as long as it barred non-believers from its leadership positions.

The law school filed a brief arguing that the case made a poor vehicle for deciding some of the issues surrounding student religious clubs in public education.

The Supreme Court spent several weeks deliberating the appeal, including taking the unusual step of requesting the lower-court records, before deciding to grant review. The case will likely be argued sometime in the spring, with a decision possible by late June.

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A federal appeals court has upheld a Texas school district's policy limiting when students may distribute written materials to their classmates.

The Plano Independent School District's 2005 policy permits distribution of materials only during the 30 minutes before and after school, three annual parties, recess, and only passively at designated tables during school hours. Also, middle and high school students may distribute materials in cafeterias and hallways during noninstructional times, but elementary students may not.

Several Plano families say the policy was adopted in response to controversy over efforts by some students to distribute religious materials, including pencils inscribed with "Jesus is the reason for the season" and candy canes with cards describing the treats' Christian origin.

Parents say their children were barred from distributing the materials over three years, including under rules that preceded the 2005 policy. The parents sued over the alleged restrictions from the earlier years as well as over the 2005 policy, saying it violated their children's free-speech rights in school.

A federal district court largely upheld the 2005 policy. In a Dec. 1 ruling in Morgan v. Plano Independent School District, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, in New Orleans, unanimously upheld the policy as well.

The appeals court found that the 2005 rules were valid, content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner of student speech.

"The regulations are aimed at providing a focused learning environment for its students," the court said, adding that it accepted a narrowing interpretation by the district court that the rules were aimed at mass distribution of materials by students to their classmates, not a student's passing of a single note or book to another.

While the district court had struck down the policy's restriction on elementary students' distribution of materials in their lunchrooms, the appeals court upheld that rule.

"The [school] district presented evidence ... that elementary school students are not as mature and require more guidance than older students in order to ensure that they are able to move through the cafeteria quickly and efficiently," the appeals court said.

The court asked the district court to decide whether the plaintiffs merited damages for the alleged limits placed on the religious messages over the three years before the 2005 policy was adopted.

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The U.S. Supreme Court today waded into the complexities of the student-loan industry, hearing a lender's challenge to a bankruptcy plan approved by lower courts that allowed an Arizona man to discharge some of his student loan debt without proving "undue hardship," as federal law requires.

Student loans are one of several debts, including back taxes and child support, that cannot easily be discharged in bankruptcy. Debtors must prove "undue hardship" to receive relief.

The case involves Francisco J. Espinosa, an airline ramp agent in Phoenix who in the late 1980s received some $13,250 in student loans to attend trade school. In 1992, Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection, and he proposed paying $274 per month over five years to United Student Aid Funds Inc., an amount that would cover his principal but not some $4,000 in interest on the loans.

Espinosa did not initiate an adversary court proceeding to prove undue hardship, as federal bankruptcy statutes require for discharging student loan debt. Instead, the bankruptcy court in Phoenix sent a notice to United Student Aid Funds alerting it of the proposed discharge plan, and giving the lender the chance to respond. The lender did not object to the bankruptcy court's confirmation of the plan.

Later, under a reinsurance plan for the federally backed loans, the U.S. Department of Education began collection efforts against Espinosa for the outstanding interest from his student loans. Espinosa went back to the bankruptcy court seeking it to order the creditors to cease their collection efforts. (United Student Aid Funds, a private lender based in Indianapolis, eventually recalled the loan from the federal Education Department and pursued its claims.)

Espinosa eventually won a ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in San Francisco, that his bankruptcy plan was valid and that the lender could not collect any more from him.

In an oral argument today that was heavy on the intricacies of the bankruptcy statute, lawyers for United Student Aid Funds and the Obama administration warned that upholding Espinosa's lower-court victory would give a green light to many more debtors to try an end run around the statutory requirements for student loan relief.

"We are talking about a statutory right here, and the fact that Congress has specifically provided that certain categories of debts, for very important public policy reasons, are carved out from discharge," Madeleine C. Wanslee, the lawyer representing the lender, told the justices. "And the reason [Espinosa's plan] is void is because it violates the plain language of the statute."

Toby J. Heytens, an assistant to the U.S. solicitor general who was arguing on the side of United Student Aid Funds, also noted there is "an important public interest at stake here, which is that the [federal] Department of Education is reinsuring all of these loans."

"There is a powerful interest in ensuring the integrity of the student loan system as a whole, that, regardless of the decisions that an individual debtor and perhaps an individual creditor are willing to make in particular cases, Congress has an overriding policy that student loans should not be discharged unless there is a determination that this is the extraordinary case, rather than the ordinary," Heytens added.

Michael J. Meehan, the lawyer representing Espinosa, conceded that the bankruptcy court did not follow the letter of federal law in approving his client's discharge plan. But, given the tremendous strains on the bankruptcy system, "I think that ... if a creditor and a debtor wanted to come in and stipulate that there would be a discharge of a portion of the student loan without a finding of undue hardship, that certainly they can do so."

The justices questioned both sides aggressively.

"Your reading is, even if the debtor is silent, totally silent, says nothing about hardship, unless the creditor objects, then the discharge will be proper; the plan can be confirmed," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said to Meehan. "So you are taking a burden that Congress has put on the debtor and switching it to the creditor."

But in an exchange with Wanslee, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wondered about a creditor that is represented in the bankruptcy court proceeding but does not object to the court's discharge of student loan debt.

"Can the creditor come in 10 years later and say this is a void judgment?" Justice Kennedy asked. When Wanslee said the creditor could, Justice Kennedy said, "I think that's an astounding conclusion."

The case, United Student Aid Funds Inc. v. Espinosa (No. 08-1134), should be decided by next July.

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